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Abstract 
Collaborative Filtering (CF) is an attractive and reliable 
recommendation technique. CF is typically implemented 
using a centralized storage of user profiles and this is a 
severe privacy danger, since an attack to this central 
repository can endanger the quality of the recommendations 
and result in a leak of personal data. This work investigates 
how a decentralized distributed storage of user profiles 
combined with data obfuscation techniques can mitigate the 
above dangers. In an experimental evaluation we initially 
show that relatively large parts of the profiles can be 
obfuscated with a minimal increase of Mean Average Error 
(MAE). This contradictory result motivates further 
experiments where we measured the increase in prediction 
error in two cases: a) when a more complex prediction task 
is considered, i.e., a data set containing more diverse 
(extreme) rating values; b) when only ratings with specific 
values are obfuscated. The results of these experiments 
clarify the roles of various rating values and will help to 
better implement an effective obfuscation policy. 
Introduction 
Collaborative Filtering (CF) is probably the most popular 
and widely used personalization technique (Herlocker et al 
1999). CF predicts user ratings for items assuming that 
people with observed similar ratings on a set of commonly 
rated items, will give similar ratings also to new unrated 
items (Shardanand and Maes 1995). In CF, the user 
profiles are represented by ratings vectors, i.e., lists of 
user's ratings on items. To generate a rating prediction for a 
given item for a target user, CF creates a neighborhood of 
users having a high degree of similarity with this target 
user, and computes a weighted average of the neighbor 
users' ratings on the given item.  
Personalization inherently brings with it the issue of 
privacy. Privacy is an important challenge facing the 
growth of the E-Commerce services and acceptance of 
their various transaction models. Many services violate 
users' privacy for their own commercial benefits. As a 
result, users refrain from using them, to prevent the 
potential exposure of personal information (Cranor et al 
1999). Privacy hazards for personalization systems are 
aggravated by the fact that effective personalization 
requires large amounts of personal data. For example, the 
accuracy of CF predictions is correlated with the number 
of similar users, number of ratings in their profiles, and the 
degree of their similarity (Sarwar et al 2000). Thus, the 
more accurate are the available user profiles, i.e., the 
higher is the number of ratings in the profile, the more 
reliable are the generated predictions. Hence, there is a 
trade-off between the accuracy of the personalization 
services provided to the users and their privacy. 
The need to protect users' privacy is nowadays triggering 
growing research efforts in the personalization community. 
In (Canny 2002) the authors proposed basing privacy 
protection on a decentralized P2P communication between 
the users, hence avoiding a single point of failure and 
privacy breach. Alternatively, (Polat and Du 2005) 
suggested preserving users' privacy on a central server by 
adding uncertainty to the data. This was accomplished 
through a data obfuscation modifying the user profiles. 
Hence, whoever is accessing the data cannot acquire 
reliable knowledge about the true ratings of the users.  
The combination of the above two techniques was 
initially proposed in (Berkovsky et al 2005).  In this case, 
the users are in full control of the personal information 
stored in their profiles. Hence, they can autonomously 
decide when and how to expose their profiles. In particular, 
they may decide which parts of the profiles should be 
obfuscated before the exposure and may obfuscate parts of 
their profiles to minimize exposure of their personal data.  
In this work we combine the above two ideas and 
mitigate privacy concerns of CF by: (1) substituting the 
commonly used centralized CF system with a virtual P2P 
one, and (2) adding some noise to the data through 
obfuscating parts of the user profiles. Here the added noise 
is considered as a way to not expose the full set of users' 
ratings and hence preserve their privacy. We evaluate the 
accuracy of the proposed privacy-enhanced CF using 
widely used CF MovieLens (Herlocker et al 1999) dataset 
and traditional MAE metric (Herlocker et al 2004). Initial 
experimental results surprisingly show that relatively large 
parts of the user profiles can be obfuscated without 
hampering the accuracy of the generated CF predictions.  
This forced us, first, to criticize the standard MAE error 
measure and, second, to better analyze the impact of the 
obfuscation of specific parts of the user profiles. Hence, we 
performed two additional experiments analyzing the 
impact of obfuscating various types of ratings. Our results 
show that a) accurate CF predictions are barely affected by 
the obfuscation of moderate (i.e., average) ratings, b) users 
with extreme ratings will be more severely penalized by 
obfuscation and c) obfuscation of more extreme ratings has 
a major impact on the prediction accuracy.  
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is an 
architecture for privacy-preserving CF and some general 
experimental results showing how to better tune the 
obfuscation policies and evaluating tradeoffs between 
accuracy and privacy preservation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents the privacy-enhanced decentralized CF. Section 3 
presents the experimental results evaluating the proposed 
approach, and section 4 concludes the paper, and presents 
directions for future research.  
Collaborative Filtering with Data Obfuscation 
This section describes the proposed approach to generate 
rating predictions and recommendations over a distributed 
repository of users' obfuscated profiles. This work adopts a 
decentralized P2P organization of users, as proposed in 
(Canny 2002). Hence, users autonomously keep and 
maintain their personal profiles such that the matrix of user 
ratings, stored by a centralized CF system, is substituted 
here by a virtual matrix, whose rows, i.e., the ratings of the 
users, are stored directly by the users. The users are 
connected using a P2P communication network (Milojicic 
et al 2002), which (1) guarantees network connectivity 
regardless of joins and departures of users, and (2) 
facilitates communication between the connected users. 
Note that the evolving setting does not have a single point 
of management or failure. Figure 1 shows the decentralized 
distribution of initially centralized ratings matrix. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Centralized vs. Decentralized Storage of the User Profiles 
 
In this setting, users are the owners of their personal 
information. They directly communicate each other during 
the prediction generation and independently decide about 
the specific ratings and parts of their profile that should be 
exposed to other users. The prediction generation process 
consists of the following stages: 
• The target user initiates the process through exposing 
parts of her profile and broadcasting a request for a 
rating prediction on a specific item to other users. Two 
parameters that should be determined for this stage are:  
1. Which parts of the profile should be exposed? To 
preserve the privacy of the target user, the number of 
ratings that are exposed should be minimized. 
However, decreasing the number of ratings may 
hamper the similarity computation, as it will rely on a 
smaller number of ratings, and, therefore, hamper the 
accuracy of the generated predictions.  
2. To which users should the request be sent? 
Theoretically, the request should be sent to all the 
available users, since any connected user in the 
network can be one of the nearest neighbors of the 
target user. Practically, this may lead to heavy 
communication overheads and requires restricting the 
set of the users to whom the request is sent  
• When the request is received, each user autonomously 
decides whether to respond to it. If she decides to 
respond, the user computes the similarity degree with the 
target user basing on the received part of the target user 
profile. When the similarity degree is computed, it is 
sent to the target user jointly with the rating on the 
requested item.  
• Upon collecting the responses, the target user builds a 
neighborhood of similar users needed for the prediction 
generation. This is by selecting K users with the highest 
similarity degree or selecting users whose similarity 
degree is above a certain threshold. Then, locally 
aggregating the ratings of the users in the neighborhood 
on the requested item.  
It should be stressed that this form of the CF prediction 
generation preserves users' privacy (by minimizing the 
exposure of the profiles), while allowing them to support 
predictions generation initiated by other users. However in 
this scenario the target user profile is exposed to other 
users and the ratings of the neighbors on the target item are 
exposed as well. Hence, in this distributed scenario the 
users may still refrain to participate in the recommendation 
process because of their privacy concerns. 
Data Obfuscation Policies 
To mitigate the above privacy breaches, we adopt data 
obfuscation techniques that focus on obfuscating the 
profiles of the responding users only, as obfuscating the 
target user profile may drastically decrease the accuracy of 
the similarity computation. Hence, parts of the responding 
users' profiles (i.e., certain ratings in their profiles) are 
substituted before computing the similarity and responding 
to the request. Although obfuscating the profiles does not 
prevent the initiator of a malicious attack to collect the 
ratings of the responding users, the ratings collected by an 
attacker will not certainly reflect the exact contents of the 
users' profiles.  
Several data obfuscation methods were proposed for the 
personal data privacy preservation: encryption (Agrawal et 
al 2004), access-control policies (Sandhu et al 1996), data 
anonymization (Klosgen 1995), etc. In this work, the term 
obfuscation refers to a generalization of approaches that 
involve modifying the original users' data for preserving 
the privacy. We develop and evaluate three general policies 
for obfuscating the ratings in the user profiles:  
• Uniform random obfuscation – substitute the real 
ratings by random values chosen uniformly in the scope 
of possible ratings in the dataset. 
• Bell-curved obfuscation – substitute the real ratings by 
values chosen using a bell-curve distribution reflecting 
the distribution of real ratings in the user's profile.  
• Default obfuscation(x) – substitute the real ratings by a 
fixed predefined value x. 
Clearly, there is a trade-off between the amount of the 
substituted data in the users' profile and the accuracy of the 
generated predictions, as the more ratings are modified, the 
less accurate are the generated predictions.  
Obfuscation and Privacy Preservation 
As prior works have already hypothesized, the importance 
of various types of ratings is different (Shardanand and 
Maes 1995). This is particularly true in the context of 
privacy-preserving CF. In fact, some ratings in the user 
profile may be more important because they convey more 
personal information and could be more useful for a rating 
prediction. From the user's point of view, two criteria for 
the importance of ratings should be distinguished: 
• Content. Certain ratings could be considered as 
sensitive, i.e., the users are concerned about disclosing 
them, because of the nature of the evaluated item. For 
example, such sensitive ratings are typically related to 
items belongings to political, sexual, and health domains. 
• Rating. Certain ratings could be considered as sensitive 
simply because of their values. In fact, extreme (i.e., 
strongly positive or negative) ratings bring more 
information about the user's preferences.  
 This work will not measure the user perceived impact of 
these factors on the privacy. But we are interested in 
measuring how ratings of various values can be obfuscated 
or correctly predicted when obfuscation is used. Our 
ultimate goal is to link this analysis to the user perceptions 
and elaborate obfuscation strategies that can optimize both 
privacy preservation and recommendation accuracy. This 
paper is a first step into this direction showing the impact 
of obfuscation on accuracy and will be complemented by a 
forthcoming study on the perceived utility of the proposed 
obfuscation strategies from the user's point of view.  
Experimental Evaluation 
For the experimental evaluation, a decentralized 
environment was simulated by a multi-threaded 
implementation. Each user was represented by a thread and 
predictions were generated in the above described manner. 
The target user initiated the prediction generation process 
and broadcasted the request to the other users. Upon 
receiving the request, each user computed the similarity 
degree with the target user, and returned it jointly with the 
rating on the requested item to the target user. Finally, the 
target user computed the predictions as a weighted average 
of the ratings of the most similar users.  
The experiments presented here were conducted using a 
commonly used CF MovieLens (Herlocker et al 1999) 
dataset. We note that highly similar results were obtained 
by conducting the same experiments on other two CF 
datasets: Jester and EachMovie. However, due to the space 
limitations, we present here the results of MovieLens only. 
MovieLens contains users' ratings on movies, given on a 
discrete scale between 1 and 5. Table 1 shows various 
parameters of the dataset: the number of users and items, 
the total number of ratings, the density of the dataset (i.e., 
the percentage of items with explicit ratings), the average 
and the variance of the ratings, and MAE of non-
personalized predictions computed by dividing the 
variance of ratings in the dataset by the range of ratings.  
These parameters are show for two datasets: full, 
containing the full set of MovieLens ratings, and extreme, 
containing only the ratings of users defined as extreme. 
Extreme users were defined as users, where more than 33% 
of their ratings are more than 50% farther from the average 
of their ratings than their variance. For example, if the 
average rating is 3 and the variance of 0.6, the ratings 
below 2.1 and above 3.9 are considered extreme. If the 
profile contains 90 ratings and more than 30 are extreme, 
the user's profile is extracted to the extreme dataset. 
Although the values of 33% and 50% are arbitrary (may be 
experimented in the future), they filter many moderate 
ratings and leave large enough dataset of extreme ratings.  
 
 
dataset users items ratings density average var. MAEnp 
full 6040 3952 1000209 0.0419 3.580 0.935 0.234 
extreme 1218 3952 175400 0.0364 3.224 1.166 0.291 
Table 1. Properties of the Experimental Datasets 
 
To analyze the extremeness of the full and extreme 
datasets, the distribution of ratings among their values was 
computed. Table 2 shows the distribution of ratings in the 
datasets. As can be seen, the number of moderate ratings in 
the full is significantly higher than in the extreme dataset, 
whereas for the extreme ratings the situation is opposite.  
 
 
dataset 1 2 3 4 5 
full 5.62% 10.75% 26.11% 34.89% 22.63% 
extreme 15.54% 11.81% 19.59% 25.32% 27.74% 
Table 2. Distribution of Ratings in the Datasets 
 
Since the above obfuscation policies are applied by 
every user, she can autonomously decide (1) whether to 
substitute the ratings stored in the profile, (2) what 
percentage of ratings should be substituted (referred to in 
the rest of the paper as obfuscation rate), and (3) which 
ratings should be substituted. In the experiments, the above 
mentioned three general obfuscation policies were 
instantiated by five specific policies: 
• Positive – substitute the real ratings by the highest 
positive rating in the dataset, i.e., 5. 
• Negative – substitute the real ratings by the lowest 
negative rating in the dataset, i.e., 1. 
• Neutral – substitute the real ratings by the neutral rating 
in the dataset, i.e., an average between the maximal and 
minimal possible ratings, i.e., 3. 
• Random – substitute the real rating by a random value 
in the range of ratings in the dataset, i.e., from 1 to 5. 
• Distribution – substitute the real rating by a value 
reflecting the distribution (i.e., average and variance) of 
the ratings in the dataset, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Note that, positive, negative and neutral policies are 
instances of the general default policy. Random policy is 
the instance of the general uniform random policy, and 
distribution policy is the general bell-curved policy.  
Four experiments were conducted in this work: 
• The first evaluates the impact of obfuscating overall 
ratings on the accuracy of overall predictions.  
• The second evaluates the impact of obfuscating overall 
ratings on the accuracy of predictions of various types of 
ratings.  
• The third evaluates the impact of obfuscation in data set 
of extreme ratings 
• The fourth evaluates the impact of obfuscating various 
types of ratings. 
To evaluate the accuracy of the generated predictions, 
we used the well-known Mean Average Error (MAE) 
metric (Herlocker et al 2004): 
1
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where N denotes the number of the predictions, pi is the 
predicted value of the item i, and ri is the real rating given 
by the user on this item. Note that low values of MAE 
reflect high accuracy of the predictions and vice-versa. 
General Impact of Obfuscation 
The first experiment was designed to examine the general 
impact of obfuscation policies on the accuracy of the 
generated predictions. For this, a set of 10,000 ratings was 
selected. These ratings were excluded from the dataset, 
their values were predicted using the above distributed CF 
procedure, and MAE of the predictions was computed. The 
10,000 predictions experiment was repeated 10 times, 
gradually increasing the obfuscation rate, i.e., increasing 
the amount of modified data in user profiles. The 
obfuscation rate increased from 0 (the original profiles are 
unchanged) to 0.9 (90% of the ratings are modified 
according to the applied policy). Figure 2 shows MAE 
values as a function of the obfuscation rate. The horizontal 
axis denotes the obfuscation rate, and the vertical denotes 
MAE values. 
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Fig. 2. MAE of the predictions vs. obfuscation rate  
 
The graph shows that the impact of random, neutral and 
distribution policies is roughly similar: obfuscating the 
user profiles has a minor impact on MAE of the 
predictions. Although MAE slightly increases in a roughly 
linear manner with the obfuscation rate, the change in 
MAE values is between 1.8% and 4.3%, and the 
predictions are relatively accurate. This could be explained 
by the observation that random, neutral and distribution 
policies does not significantly modify the profiles of users 
(as the modified values are similar to the real ratings), and 
therefore creates only a small impact on MAE.  
Conversely, positive and negative policies perturbate 
severely the user profile replacing the ratings with 
extremely positive or negative ratings. As a result, the 
generated predictions are inaccurate and MAE increases 
with obfuscation rate to 33% and 34%.  
Note that for random, neutral and distribution policies 
and high obfuscation rates, the prediction accuracy is good 
and MAE is relatively low. In this case, MAE approaches 
the MAE of the non-personalized predictions. 
In summary, the overall impact of an undifferentiated 
obfuscation on the accuracy of the predictions is minor. 
This raises a question regarding the conditions where this 
observation is true. In other words, what rating predictions 
are more effected by data obfuscation? Answering this 
question will allow drawing a conclusion regarding the 
applicability of obfuscation for the task of generating 
accurate CF predictions for various types of ratings. 
Impact of Obfuscation on the Prediction of Various 
Rating Values 
In a second experiment we aimed at evaluating the impact 
of data obfuscation on the predictions of various types of 
ratings. In this experiment, the ratings in the MovieLens 
dataset were partitioned to 5 groups, according to the 
values of the ratings: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. For each group, 
1,000 ratings were excluded from the dataset. Distribution 
policy was applied, and CF predictions were generated for 
all the excluded ratings. MAE of the predictions was 
computed for every group of ratings, gradually increasing 
the obfuscation rate from 0 to 0.9. Figure 3 shows MAE 
values for various groups of ratings. The horizontal axis 
shows the groups of ratings and the vertical denotes MAE 
values. Note that for the sake of clarity, the chart shows 4 
obfuscation rates only: 0, 0.3, 0.6 and 0.9. For other 
obfuscation rates, not shown in this figure, the behavior of 
MAE curves is similar.  
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Fig. 3. MAE of the predictions for various groups of ratings  
 
As can be clearly seen, the impact of the data 
obfuscation on the predictions of various types of ratings is 
different. For moderate ratings prediction, in the central 
part of the ratings scale, the impact of the obfuscation is 
minor as MAE roughly remains unchanged, regardless of 
the obfuscation rate. Conversely, for extreme (both 
extremely positive and negative) ratings, the impact of the 
obfuscation is stronger and MAE steadily increases with 
the obfuscation rate. Thus, the accuracy of the extreme 
ratings predictions is hampered when by the obfuscation of 
user profiles. Conversely, the accuracy of the moderate 
ratings predictions roughly remains unchanged regardless 
of the obfuscation rate.  
Obfuscation in a Data Set of Extreme Ratings 
In a third experiment, we examined the impact of the 
above obfuscation policies on the accuracy of predictions 
in a data set composed by users with more extreme ratings. 
For this, the extreme dataset (described in Table 1) was 
extracted from the full dataset. Then a set of 10,000 ratings 
was selected and excluded from the dataset. The values of 
these ratings were predicted and MAE of the predictions 
was computed. This experiment was repeated 10 times, 
gradually increasing the obfuscation rate from 0 to 0.9. 
Figure 4 shows MAE as a function of the obfuscation rate. 
The horizontal axis denotes the values of the obfuscation 
rate, and the vertical denotes MAE values. 
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Fig. 4. MAE of the predictions vs. obfuscation rate  
 
The experimental results clearly show that here MAE 
more quickly increases with the obfuscation rate. For 
random, neutral and distribution obfuscation policies, the 
increase of MAE is between 6.9% and 9.8%. However, for 
positive and negative policies, the negative impact of data 
obfuscation is stronger and the increase of MAE is 
between 13.6% and 14%. Note that in this data set random, 
neutral and distribution policies show a larger increase of 
MAE than in the overall dataset, where it was between 
1.8% and 4.3%. Conversely, for positive and negative 
policies, the increase of MAE is lower than in the overall 
obfuscation experiment (was between 33% and 34%). This 
is explained by the observation that most of the ratings in 
the extreme ratings dataset are originally extreme. Hence, 
substituting such values with extreme values will not 
significantly modify the data in many cases and MAE 
values will be lower than in the overall experiment.  
In summary, this shows that impact of extreme ratings 
obfuscation on the accuracy of extreme ratings predictions 
is stronger than impact of overall obfuscation on the 
accuracy of overall predictions. In other words for a given 
reduction of the accuracy, the moderate ratings can be 
more extensively obfuscated compared to extreme ratings. 
Selective Ratings Obfuscation  
To precisely analyze the impact of obfuscation of certain 
ratings, in a fourth experiment we evaluated the impact of 
localized data obfuscation, i.e., the obfuscation of certain 
ratings only. For this, the data were partitioned to 5 groups, 
according to the values of the ratings: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and 
a set of 10,000 ratings, ranging among all possible values, 
was selected and excluded from the dataset. Then, the 
values of a certain group of ratings were obfuscated using 
distribution policy, the excluded ratings were predicted and 
MAE of the predictions was computed. This experiment 
was repeated 10 times, gradually increasing the 
obfuscation rate from 0 to 0.9. We stress that in each 
experiment the obfuscation was applied on the ratings of a 
single group of ratings only, i.e., a certain percentage of 
ratings with a certain value only was substituted.  
It should be stressed that the obfuscation rates in this 
case do not reliably express the amount of the obfuscated 
data. Since the number of ratings in every group of ratings 
is different (see Table 2), obfuscating a certain percentage 
of group ratings actually obfuscates a different number of 
ratings in every group and has a different impact. This was 
balanced by dividing the computed MAE values by the 
number of ratings in the respective group and, therefore 
comparing the relative impact of every obfuscated rating.  
Figure 5 shows the results of the experiments. The 
horizontal axis denotes the groups of ratings that were 
obfuscated, whereas the vertical denotes the overall MAE 
computed on the test set (containing ratings with all 
possible values). Note that for the sake of clarity, the chart 
shows the curves related to four obfuscation rates only: 0, 
0.3, 0.6 and 0.9. For the other obfuscation rates not shown 
in this figure, the behavior of MAE curves is similar. 
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Fig. 5. MAE of the predictions for obfuscation of various ratings  
 
As can be seen from the chart, the impact of obfuscating 
various types of ratings is completely different. When 
moderate ratings are obfuscated, the increase of MAE is 
minor, regardless of the obfuscation rate. Conversely, 
obfuscating extreme (both extremely positive and negative) 
ratings has a stronger impact on MAE. This further 
supports the above observation regarding the importance of 
extreme ratings for generation of accurate CF predictions. 
It must be noted that extreme negative ratings obfuscation 
has a larger impact on the precision. Although this may 
have many reasons, we conjecture that it is explained by 
their importance in characterizing the user preferences, as 
negative ratings are rare in CF data (see Table 2). In 
summary, this experiment shows that the accuracy of CF 
predictions is hampered when the extreme ratings in user's 
profile are obfuscated, especially the negative extreme 
ratings. Conversely, the accuracy remains roughly 
unchanged when moderate ratings are obfuscated.  
These conclusions are particularly important for a 
privacy preserving CF system. They validate the trade-off 
between privacy and accuracy in CF, which seemed to be 
contradicted by the first experiment, and show that the 
impact of obfuscating extreme ratings is stronger than of 
obfuscating moderate ratings. Hence, they enable to tune 
the obfuscation strategy to better optimize privacy 
preservation and system accuracy. 
Conclusions and Future Research 
This work was motivated by the objective of enhancing the 
privacy preservation of the CF recommendation approach. 
We presented a distributed architecture and an obfuscation 
approach to preserve user privacy. We have evaluated the 
impact of this data obfuscation technique on the accuracy 
of the predictions generated by a CF based recommender 
system. Initial experimental results showed that relatively 
large parts of the profiles can be obfuscated, without 
hampering the accuracy of the predictions. A further 
analysis shown that when extreme ratings were obfuscated, 
the accuracy of the predictions decreased much faster with 
the obfuscation rate. This implies that extreme ratings are 
more important for generating accurate CF predictions than 
moderate ratings. Hence, these parts of the profiles are the 
most valuable for accurate predictions, and they should be 
preserved, while the moderate ratings are less important 
and can be obfuscated with a minor impact on the accuracy 
of the predictions. Similar results were obtained also using 
other CF datasets, which strengthens our conclusions. 
Although the results support the conclusions regarding 
the importance of different parts of the profiles, they may 
seem controversial. One of the well-known problems of the 
CF is sparsity (Sarwar et al 2000), where the number of 
ratings in user profiles is insufficient for generating 
accurate predictions. One may assume that obfuscating the 
user profiles aggravates the sparsity. We hypothesize that 
this does not happen due to the user data redundancy, as 
the interests of a user can be determined basing on a small 
number of ratings. Hence, data obfuscation reduces the 
redundancy, but does not increase the user profiles 
sparsity. In the future, we plan to validate this hypothesis. 
The ultimate goal of this paper is the design of a 
practical privacy preserving CF approach. We believe that 
the above results, jointly with a detailed analysis of the 
user perceived benefits of data obfuscation, can lead to an 
effective privacy-preserving recommendation technology. 
In fact, exploiting these results, together with a measure of 
the utility of various obfuscation policies presented here, 
allows a system designer to derive obfuscation policies, 
which maximize both prediction accuracy and privacy 
preservation. Moreover, we believe that information theory 
analysis of the proposed obfuscation policies can lead to 
identifying policies, which are better suited to support 
accurate prediction generation using the modified user 
data. In the future, we plan to investigate these issues.  
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